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Abstract 
This paper uses a two-region, two-period overlapping generations model with 
international labor mobility to examine the efficacy of using tax policy to internalize the 
externalities created by international labor migration.  While a brain drain tax has a 
substantial limiting effect on labor migration and a small negative effect on per worker 
growth, it is found to be a viable solution to the negative externality problem.  It is also 
found that the brain-drain tax can raise substantial tax revenue for the SMCs which could 
be used to enhance human capital in the region. 
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  11. Introduction 
  Euro-Mediterranean Region countries have strong demographic differences.   
Within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) part of this region, Arab countries 
have higher fertility and population growth rates and a significantly younger age structure 
than other countries and regions.  The 2002 Arab Human Development Report notes that 
this can present a “demographic gift or a demographic curse” depending on whether the 
high population growth and fertility can be transformed into human wealth through 
capital investments and technological progress.  Similarly, in a recent study, Dhonte, 
Bhattacharya and Yousef (2000) argued that the expected “explosion” in working-age 
population in the Middle East present challenges as well as opportunities for these 
countries.  These unique demographic characteristics show stark contrast to the European 
counterparts where countries are going through a serious population aging trend.
1  Table 
1 shows the significant demographic differences between MENA countries, 9 Southern 
Mediterranean Countries
2 as a subgroup of MENA countries and 19 European countries.  
Population projections show that MENA countries stand out as the group that is clearly 
different from the European countries particularly until 2060.  Southern Mediterranean 
countries have by and large similar population characteristics to the general MENA 
group.  MENA and Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) have and will continue to 
have significantly younger populations than the European countries while this gap 
between these countries is expected to close to a large extent by 2060.  It’s also 
noteworthy that SMCs are expected to have a considerable increase in their working-age 
population (population 15-64) between 2000 and 2030 relative to both European 
countries and the general group of MENA countries. 
                                                 
1 See Heller (2003) and CSIS (2002) for recent discussions on the aging trend in developed countries. 
2 These are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Israel is not 
included in this group due its demographic similarity to more developed countries. 
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<Insert Table 1 here> 
One important outcome of the demographic differences mentioned above has 
been substantial labor migration from the Southern Mediterranean to the European 
countries in the North.
3  According to the United Nations’ 2005 revision of international 
migration trends, Europe has been host to about 34 per cent of all migrants in 2005.  
Fargues (2006) showed that “Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation 
Arab emigrants, and hosts 59% of all such emigrants worldwide” (Fargues, 2006: 8, 25).  
While such labor migration has been driven mainly by economic and demographic 
differences between these two regions, it has created important externalities.  These 
externalities took the form of negative externalities through brain drain in the SMCs and 
both positive externalities through brain gain and negative externalities through 
congestion and social problems for the European countries.
4  Bhagwati (1972, 1976a, 
1976b) argued that taxing this brain drain could be a solution to the negative externality 
problem.  He also argued that the current system of income taxation based on residence 
instead of citizenship leads to representation of immigrant workers in home countries 
without taxation.  This brain-drain tax idea is resurfacing again in the recent literature 
where several papers have argued the virtues of such a tax for developing countries 
(Desai, Kapur and McHale, 2004; Straubhaar, 2000).   
This paper puts international labor migration into a global externalities framework 
that has recently been popularized by Kaul et al. (1999, 2006).  At the same time, the 
                                                 
3 These demographic differences can also lead to capital flows between regions.  See Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig and Winter (2005), Tosun (2003) and Tosun (2001) for studies on examining the link between 
population aging and capital flows.  
4 One may argue that workers’ remittances to the SMCs are positive externalities from labor migration to 
Europe. However, these are pecuniary externalities and hence do not fall under the category of 
technological externalities examined by the public finance literature. 
  3paper contributes to the literature on brain drain taxation that dates back to Bhagwati’s 
original proposal in mid-1970s. The paper uses a two-region, two-period overlapping 
generations model with international labor mobility to examine the efficacy of using tax 
policy to internalize the externalities created by international labor migration.  The goal is 
to examine the human capital, growth and welfare consequences of labor movements and 
a “brain-drain tax” similar to what was originally proposed by Bhagwati (1972).       
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a description of a two-
region, two-period overlapping generations model with international labor mobility. This 
is followed by a transition analysis in section 3 that shows results from a numerical 
simulation exercise. Section 4 shows the budgetary implications of the brain drain tax and 
discusses issues related to the administration of such a tax. The last section presents 
summary and concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Two-Region Model of Brain Drain and Taxation 
The model builds on a two-period overlapping generations model first developed 
by Diamond (1965)
5. To examine open economy issues, the standard framework is 
extended to a two-region model with international labor mobility similar to Galor (1986, 
1992) and Crettez et al. (1996, 1998)
6. Labor mobility has a dual effect in the sense that 
it exhibits the characteristics of capital as well.  Young migrant workers contribute to the 
economy both as laborers through their human capital, and as savers through their supply 
of capital.  Another major extension is modeling the link between human capital 
accumulation and tax policy to address the brain drain and taxation issues.  Brain-drain 
tax is assumed to be just the home country’s income tax rate imposed on the migrant 
                                                 
5 However, the earliest overlapping generations models are described by Allais (1947) and Samuelson 
(1958). Children are not modeled in a two-period model. 
6 A two-country model with international capital mobility is shown by Buiter (1981). 
  4workers.  Hence, it is really not a separate tax.  For clarity, the model is presented for one 
region only. This is followed by a description of the two-region world equilibrium.   
 
2.1. Households 
Individuals live for two periods and seek to maximize a utility function based on 
discretionary consumption in the first and second period of their lives, 
1
1
ln ln ,
1
jt jt UC C +
⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟ +δ ⎝⎠
  (1) 
here j indexes individuals,   is consumption when young,   is consumption when 
old, and   is the pure rate of time preference. The period-specific budget constraints in 
the first and the second periods are: 
jt C 1 + jt C
δ
First period: () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 jtj j tj tt tj Ca Sa w l a += − τ   
Second Period:  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 11 ,   jt j t t jt j Ca r S a ++ + =+− τ  (2) 
where  () jtj Sa is first period saving,   is the wage rate individual j faces,   is 
effective labor,
t w () tj la
7 where   is the ability level of individual j,  j a 1 t r+  is the rate of return to 
capital,  t τ  is the rate of income taxation that is applied to both capital and labor income.  
This tax is used entirely to finance a productivity enhancing public program.  For 
simplicity, this public program will be referred to as “education” throughout the text.
8 
The goal is to highlight the strong link between this type of government spending and 
                                                 
7Here, young supplies one unit of time to the economy. Note that, making the allocation of time between 
“schooling” and supplying labor endogenous does not change this analysis.  
8 It should be noted that any other government program that is directed towards increasing the labor 
productivity of young could easily be used. 
  5human capital accumulation, which is considered to be one of the most important avenues 
for economic growth.
9
It is assumed that there is a continuous distribution of abilities that is replicated in 
each new generation. The ability level of individual j is indexed by  , which ranges 
from 0 to 1. The density function of abilities is denoted by f(a) where by definition: 
j a
()
1
0
1 . fa d a = ∫    (3) 
Human capital is accumulated from the interaction of ability level ( j a ) of the individual 
and government spending per young ( ) on education: 
e
t g
( ) 1,
e
tj j t la a g
ψ
⎡ =Φ + ⎣⎤ ⎦  (4) 
where, Φ denotes an index on human capital efficiency and ψ  is a parameter indicating 
the return to human capital from the inputs ( j a  and  ).
e
t g
10 The form of the human capital 
function is chosen so that even individuals with the lowest ability (0 j a ) =  will contribute 
to the economy in terms of human capital (see Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun 2004). 
From the maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (4); we get the familiar first order 
condition: 
() () () () 1
11
1
.  
11
jt j jt j
tt
Ca C a
r
+
++
+δ
=
+− τ
 (5) 
Using (5) and (2), we derive the optimal saving of an individual j: 
() () ()
1
1
2
jt j t t t j Sa w l a =− τ
+δ
. (6) 
                                                 
9 Tosun (2005) introduced a social security program in the model by having an exogenously fixed level of 
social security spending. An income tax that is earmarked for social security adjusts through the periods to 
balance the social security budget. Thus, there are separate taxes for education and social security spending 
with voters deciding only on the education tax rate.  The results from that paper showed that modeling 
social security in this way only affected the magnitude of the effects, not the qualitative results. 
10ψ  should be less than or equal to unity to prevent increasing returns from government spending.  
  6Saving of an individual depends on net labor earnings but it is independent of the interest 
rate. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function.  Given (5) and (6), it is 
straightforward to derive consumption functions in each period: 
() () ()
()
() () () () () 11
1
1
1
2
                                                                                      
11 1
.
2
jt j t t t j
t t tt tj
jt j
Ca w l a
rw l a
Ca
++
+
+δ
=− τ
+δ
+− τ − τ
=
+δ
 (7) 
 
2.2. Political Process of Tax Policy and Brain Drain 
To make the process of tax policy determination for education rich, interesting, 
yet tractable, a median-voter framework with voter heterogeneity is used.
11 This 
framework suggests that public sector responds to voter preferences over the long period 
(thirty years) assumed in the two-period overlapping generations model.  Voter 
heterogeneity is introduced by assuming a distribution of genetic ability levels for the 
working generation.
12 The ability level of the individual will, in turn, determine the value 
she receives from education.   
  The consumption and saving decisions, as seen section 2.1, depend on human 
capital, which is in turn determined by government spending (see equation 4). By 
plugging these into (1), we get the indirect utility function, which each voter maximizes, 
in determining his or her preferred tax rate, subject to the government budget constraint 
                                                 
11 The political process is modeled through a median voter framework because the conditions for the 
median voter theorem are satisfied. The choice of voters is over a single dimension since the preferred 
education tax rate is the only choice variable, and the voter preferences are single peaked. The property of 
single-peakedness has been demonstrated to ensure existence of a voting equilibrium (Black 1948). 
12 While not very realistic, uniform distribution is used for its simplicity in deriving analytical results. 
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e
tt t yg τ=)
13 The preferred tax rate of individual j 
when young is: 
()()
1
 .  
1
jt
jt j
jt
ay
a
ay
ψ−
τ=
+ψ
 (8) 
Equation (8) is the tax rate each individual prefers based on her ability level. This 
preferred tax rate is increasing in both ability level  j a  and in income per young.  In 
addition, because the old do not derive any benefit from publicly provided education and 
there are no bequests in the model, they incur a cost without enjoying any benefits. 
Therefore, their preferred education tax rate will always be zero, regardless of their 
ability.  
Total population in each period is  t t N N + −1  where Nt is composed of both newly 
born nationals and migrant workers. Given this, the median voter is defined by 
()
1
1
0
,
2
m a
t
tt
NN
NN f a d a
−
−
+
+= ∫
t
                                                
 (9) 
where am is the ability level of the median voter.  
With lower population growth (due to lower fertility or labor outflow), the median 
voter becomes a person with lower ability (see Appendix), and the preferred tax rate of 
the median voter is lower.  This, in turn, leads to a lower government spending on public 
education which has a negative impact on human capital accumulation.  Hence, for 
example, the impact of labor outflows on human capital in the SMCs would be two fold: 
first through loss of total human capital from emigration of workers and second through 
reduced average human capital for each remaining worker.  While the former effect is the 
typical brain drain argument, the latter is an additional brain drain effect from loss of 
 
13 It is assumed in each period that government uses the entire revenue from this tax to finance the public 
good for all young equally, regardless of their ability level (Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar 2000). 
  8productive political participation of young workers in home country.  This latter effect is 
a novel aspect of the model which has not been widely addressed in the previous 
literature.  A brain drain tax enables representation with taxation.  By paying the home 
country’s income tax, migrant workers are allowed to vote for the tax rate and thereby 
help improve the provision of education in the home country. 
 
2.3. Producers 
  Each country produces a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production 
technology. 
1  , tt t YK H
α− α =Λ  (10) 
here   is the productivity index,  Λ K  is capital stock and H  is aggregate supply of human 
capital. The aggregate supply of human capital is: 
() ()
1
0
. tt HN l a f a d a = ∫  (11) 
Human capital per worker, using (4) and (11), is 
   (12)  () ( )
1
0
1 tt ha g f a
ψ =Φ + ∫ . d a
Competitive factor markets require that real wage and interest rates are equal to the 
marginal products of labor and capital respectively. Therefore, factor demand equations 
are: 
() 1
t
t
t
k
w
h
α
⎛⎞
=− α Λ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
   (13) 
1
 .
t
t
t
k
r
h
α−
⎛⎞
=α Λ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (14) 
  9Here,   are capital stock per worker and human 
capital per worker, respectively.  
/ and / tt t tt kK N hH N == t
  Using (6) and (12), saving per worker can be expressed as 
()( ) ( )
1
0
1
11
2
tt t t s w ag f a da
ψ ⎛⎞ =− τ Φ + ⎜⎟ +δ ⎝⎠ ∫ .  (15) 
 
2.4. International Equilibrium with and without the Brain Drain Tax  
  In the absence of international capital mobility, capital market equilibrium 
requires that saving in each period equals to accumulated capital in the following period. 
Capital market equilibrium conditions for each region can be depicted as  
1
1
A A
A tt
t A
t
Ns
k
N
+
+
=  (16) 
1
1
,
BB
B tt
t B
t
Ns
k
N
+
+
=  (17) 
where, superscripts A and B denote regions.   
  To close the dynamic model, international labor market equilibrium must be 
specified. In the case of perfect international labor mobility, international labor market 
equilibrium requires  
() ( ) 11 1 1 11 .
A BA A B
tt t t t NN N N ++ + + += + η + + η
B
t  (18) 
where,   are the population growth rates in region A and region B, 
respectively. In the perfect labor mobility model, labor income is taxed where income is 
B
t
A
t 1 1   and   + + η η
  10earned. Thus, source based income taxation is used for both regions.
14 This implies that 
net-of-tax wage rates are equalized in equilibrium. Therefore, the international labor flow 
constraint is: 
( ) ( )
B
t
B
t
A
t
A
t w w 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + − = − τ τ . (19) 
It is assumed that only the members of the young generation moves between 
regions. Both regions are assumed to have “uniform” ability distributions, which mean 
that migration does not have any effect on the ability distribution in these regions.
15  
 
When a brain drain tax is imposed, the international labor flow condition above 
changes. To see this change, assume that region A is Europe and region B is the Southern 
Mediterranean.  In that case, the income tax rate of region B will be imposed as a brain 
drain tax on the workers that migrate to region A.
16 Hence, labor from region B will flow 
to region A according to the following condition: 
( ) ( )
B
t
B
t
B
t
A
t
A
t w w 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − = − − τ τ τ  (20) 
The model incorporates the interaction of household behavior, firm behavior, 
political process, and international labor flows. The model explained above will be used 
to examine the labor flows between two regions that have strong population differences 
such as Europe and Southern Mediterranean and the impact of these flows on the human 
capital accumulation in both regions.   
 
                                                 
14Under a source system, labor income is taxed where income is earned. The model tax treaties of the 
OECD and the United Nations both give source countries the first rights to tax income accrued within their 
borders.  
15 A more realistic case is allowing for migration of workers that have certain abilities (unskilled vs. 
skilled). However, this would conflict with the uniform ability distribution which assumes that ability 
levels in the distribution are chosen at random. 
16 It’s assumed here that brain drain tax is a tax that is only imposed by the SMCs (region B). This is in line 
with the main negative externalities argument based on brain drain from the SMCs. 
  113. Aging Europe and Brain Drain from SMCs 
3.1. Closed Economy and Labor Mobility Simulation Results 
  Simulations in this section are based on the population projections for European 
countries and the SMCs derived from the 2002 revision of the “World Population 
Prospects” published by the United Nations (United Nations, 2002a). The simulations 
will be shown for two 30-year periods, 2000–30 and 2030–60 and for the entire period 
2000–60. The average population growth rates for the 1970–2000 period are used as a 
starting point.  
  A critical parameter in the model is the elasticity of human capital with respect to 
government spending on education and ability level (ψ). Laitner (2000b) used a human 
capital function that is similar to (4) and set his human capital elasticity with respect to 
education equal to 0.1967. Based on an initial value of the ability of the median voter, 
Laitner’s estimate corresponds approximately to  0.4 ψ =  in our model. However, series 
of studies (and updates) by Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994 and 2004) estimated a 
significantly higher rate of return to education for low income and developing countries 
compared to developed countries. Hence, ψ = 0.5 is chosen as a compromise given 
Laitner’s estimate and the SMCs used in population projections. 
  We start with the “perfect labor mobility model” where there is perfect 
international labor mobility with migrant labor participating in the political system of the 
host country but not the home country. Based on the population projections for the two 
regions, labor migrates from the SMCs to the European countries. Figure 1 shows this in 
reference to the change in the number of workers in both regions. European countries 
experience a major boom in foreign workers, particularly between 2000 and 2030.  This 
boom is almost about six times greater than the growth attributed to the native worker 
  12population.  Figure 2, on the other hand, shows that the SMCs send labor to Europe and 
thus experience significantly lower domestic labor growth despite a high population 
growth.   
<Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here> 
  We now compare this to our alternative “labor mobility model with brain drain 
tax” where migrant workers participate in the political system of both host and home 
countries but at the same time remit the additional income tax (brain drain tax) to the 
home country.  Figure 3 shows that this leads to a significant decrease in the number of 
workers migrating to Europe in both periods.  Figure 4 mainly confirms this by showing 
that the growth in the number of workers lost to out-migration of workers is very small 
compared to the overall growth in number of workers.  Apparently, brain drain tax acts as 
a significant migration control mechanism.  
<Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here>   
 
3.2. Model Comparisons 
  To understand the economic and fiscal impact of brain drain through labor flows, 
we first compare the perfect labor mobility model to a closed economy model.  These 
simulation results are shown in columns (1)-(4) of Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 shows the per 
worker values of selected economic variables.  European countries benefit from labor 
migration from the SMCs particularly in terms of education spending per worker and 
human capital per worker.  However, they are adversely impacted by the large influx of 
foreign workers in the 2000-2030 period.  The benefits of the labor migration to Europe 
are even clearer when we look at the aggregate economic values shown in Table 3.  The 
aging Europe clearly benefits from the economic expansion made possible by the 
  13contributions of migrant workers as laborers, savers and participants in the policymaking 
that determines the provision of the productivity enhancing public good (education).  
SMCs, on the other hand, suffer economically (lower capital, human capital and income 
growth) mainly due to loss of workers to the European countries.  As mentioned before, 
the impact of the loss of workers on human capital in the SMCs are two fold: first 
through loss of total human capital from outflow of workers and second through reduced 
average human capital for each remaining worker which is due to the loss of productive 
political participation of young workers in the home country.  We see the clear evidence 
of this in the sharp decreases in the income tax rate in the SMCs in both periods.        
  The next comparison is with the labor mobility model with brain drain tax.  
Simulation results for this model are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Tables 2 and 3.  
European countries seem to benefit from such a tax through smaller labor flows that lead 
to more stable changes in the per worker values of their economic variables, particularly 
in capital per worker and income per worker.  On the other hand, their aggregate 
economic expansion is also less pronounced.  Hence, while the brain drain tax has a 
negative impact on the overall economic activity in European countries, it also triggers a 
relatively more stable economic growth by limiting large influx of workers.  For the 
SMCs, the brain drain tax improves on both the human capital per worker and total 
human capital accumulation.  While it seems to limit economic growth slightly in per 
worker terms, it contributes significantly to aggregate economic expansion as seen in 
Table 3. By limiting harmful out-migration of workers, the brain drain tax functions like 
a Pigouvian tax which is considered a first-best solution to the negative externality 
problem. 
 
  145. Budgetary Implications of the Brain Drain Tax and Some Administration 
Issues 
Simulations in the previous section give us an idea about the budgetary 
implications of such a tax for the SMCs.  Considering the results for number of migrants, 
the income tax rate in the SMCs and the income per worker in the European countries, 
the share of the brain drain tax in total income tax revenues in the SMCs is calculated as 
2% for the 2000-2030 period and 3% for the 2030-2060 period.  Using actual tax revenue 
figures from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 
these shares translate to about $1.3 billion in average annual income tax revenue for total 
of SMCs until 2030 and about $2.8 billion until 2060.
17  These are sizeable revenues that 
SMCs can potentially use to provide enhanced education to the existing workforce and in 
turn help improve human capital accumulation in the SMCs.  A recent study by Desai, 
Kapur and McHale (2004) shows a similarly substantial potential revenue gain to India 
from such taxation.  However, there can be significant issues related to the administration 
and use of such a brain drain tax.  First, this tax requires a tax system based on citizenship 
(the American model) rather than residence in the SMCs.  Currently, these countries use a 
residence-based income tax system and switching to a citizenship-based system would 
bring significant administrative costs.  Involvement of international institutions and 
creation of new international migration regimes have also been discussed (Straubhaar, 
2000; Pastore, 2005).  Additionally, government sector inefficiencies due to corruption in 
the SMCs could also become a hindrance to the productive use of this new revenue 
stream. 
 
                                                 
17 GFS revenue figures come from IMF (2003) and are for eight of the nine SMCs. Libya is excluded due to 
lack of data.  Tax revenues are averaged for the last three available years (1995-97) and then converted to  
constant 1995 dollars.  
  156. Conclusions 
This paper put international labor migration into a global externalities framework 
using the brain drain taxation as one solution to internalize negative externalities from 
labor migration. The paper used a two-region, two-period overlapping generations model 
with international labor mobility to examine the efficacy of using such tax policy.  While 
a brain drain tax has a substantial limiting effect on labor migration and a small negative 
effect on per worker growth, it is found to be a viable solution to the negative externality 
problem created by labor migration.  It can also raise substantial tax revenue for the 
SMCs which could be used to enhance human capital in the region.  Administrative costs 
involved with the tax system required to implement a brain-drain tax constitute the 
biggest obstacle to the use of such a tax. 
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Table 1. Demographic Differences Between Europe and Middle East and North Africa 
  2000 2030  2060 
 
Share of 
Population 
15 - 64 (%) 
Share of 
Population 
65 and Older 
(%) 
Share of 
Population 
15 - 64 (%) 
Share of 
Population 
65 and Older 
(%) 
Share of 
Population 
15 - 64 (%) 
Share of 
Population 
65 and Older 
(%) 
Austria  61.86  15.50 56.40 26.33 48.75 31.59 
Belgium  59.62  17.01 54.63 25.02 51.02 27.92 
Cyprus  57.34  11.49 56.57 19.82 52.46 26.51 
Denmark 61.54  14.99  55.31 23.59 53.36 25.20 
Finland  60.54  14.93 53.15 25.81 51.33 27.33 
France  58.63  15.96 54.32 23.63 52.18 26.88 
Germany  62.39  16.31 54.86 26.42 50.39 28.43 
Greece  60.89  17.50 57.37 25.87 48.82 32.44 
Iceland  57.45  11.70 56.36 20.00 52.45 26.38 
Ireland  58.21  11.31 58.46 17.64 53.40 25.03 
Italy  62.33  18.07 56.00 28.22 48.40 33.17 
Luxembourg 61.61  13.79  59.44 18.23 54.23 24.13 
Netherlands  62.16  13.62 55.74 23.28 53.22 25.24 
Norway  58.93  15.36 55.22 23.26 52.04 27.32 
Portugal  61.10  15.61 58.87 22.48 51.25 29.00 
Spain  62.19  16.79 58.33 25.45 47.69 34.05 
Sweden  58.60  17.40 53.47 25.17 50.01 28.91 
Switzerland  61.86  15.99 52.47 29.78 48.92 31.13 
United  Kingdom  58.90  15.86 57.18 21.11 52.98 25.15 
Algeria 49.26  4.12  62.12  8.71  56.44  20.89 
Bahrain  59.97  2.51  63.56 10.78 58.73 19.39 
Djibouti  43.54  3.00 49.95 4.38 59.60 7.92 
Egypt 48.01  4.45  58.07  8.03  59.03  16.63 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 46.85  4.46  62.42  8.39  54.63  23.04 
Iraq 44.32  2.80  54.98  4.96  60.82  12.06 
Jordan 47.33  2.82  60.28  6.19  58.94  16.98 
Kuwait  64.84  1.34  63.24 11.84 57.25 21.18 
Lebanon  53.45  6.10  62.34 10.76 55.45 22.31 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  50.32  3.53  61.96  8.19  56.48  20.43 
Morocco 51.80  4.25  60.41  8.92  57.77  18.57 
Oman 50.29  1.99  55.20  5.92  59.29  12.64 
Qatar  64.54  1.55  57.86 15.23 59.28 17.99 
Saudi Arabia  48.49  2.53  57.67  6.04  60.64  13.91 
Syrian Arab Republic  44.54 2.92  60.06  6.24  58.34  17.72 
United Arab Emirates  64.75  1.21  59.12 16.25 54.97 23.19 
Tunisia  53.24  5.64  62.02 11.61 53.62 24.78 
Turkey  52.70  5.47  62.01 10.76 56.27 21.50 
Yemen  37.37  2.37 42.29 2.66 55.15 5.11 
Average of 19 European 
Countries  60.32  15.22 56.01 23.74 51.21 28.20 
Average of 19 MENA 
Countries  51.35 3.32  58.71  8.73  57.51  17.70 
Average of 9 Southern 
Medit. Countries  50.07 4.37  61.03  8.82  56.93  19.98 
Source: United Nations (2002). 
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Table 1. Cont’d 
 
Average Annual 
Population Growth Rate 
in % (2000-2030) 
Average Annual 
Population Growth Rate 
in % (2030-2060) 
Austria -0.08 -0.39 
Belgium 0.08 -0.17 
Cyprus 0.49 -0.09 
Denmark 0.09 -0.21 
Finland 0.05 -0.28 
France 0.30 -0.09 
Germany -0.03 -0.21 
Greece -0.10 -0.49 
Iceland 0.57 -0.04 
Ireland 0.82 0.10 
Italy -0.35 -0.69 
Luxembourg 1.33 0.61 
Netherlands 0.28 -0.13 
Norway 0.33 -0.10 
Portugal -0.10 -0.43 
Spain -0.07 -0.44 
Sweden 0.07 -0.20 
Switzerland -0.24 -0.61 
United Kingdom  0.31 0.08 
Algeria 1.53 0.39 
Bahrain 2.06 0.59 
Djibouti 2.04 1.37 
Egypt 2.03 0.74 
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  1.40 0.44 
Iraq 3.17 1.25 
Jordan 2.39 0.75 
Kuwait 2.89 0.58 
Lebanon 1.16 0.17 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  1.84 0.54 
Morocco 1.53 0.44 
Oman 3.34 1.35 
Qatar 1.38 0.26 
Saudi Arabia  3.17 1.18 
Syrian Arab Republic  2.45 0.80 
United Arab Emirates  1.46 -0.03 
Tunisia 0.99 0.11 
Turkey 1.15 0.22 
Yemen 6.03 3.35 
Average of 19 European 
Countries  0.20 -0.20 
Average of 19 MENA 
Countries  2.21 0.76 
Average of 9 Southern 
Mediterranean Countries  1.68 0.46 
Source: United Nations (2002). 
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Table 2. Model Comparisons 1/ 
(per worker values) 
 
    
 
Closed Economy 
Model 
(No Labor Mobility) 
  
Perfect Labor Mobility 
Model 
with Migrants Voting 
Only in Host Country 
  
Labor Mobility Model 
with Migrants Voting in 
Both Countries and 
Income Tax on Brain 
Drain 
  
 
Time 
Periods 
 
European 
Countries 
(1) 
 
 
SMCs 
(2) 
  
European 
Countries 
(3) 
 
 
SMCs 
(4) 
  
European 
Countries 
(5) 
 
 
SMCs 
(6) 
               
Number of workers  2000–2030  22.2  97.2    150.2  46.8    27.7  95.0 
  2030–2060  9.1 36.0    27.3 23.8   16.7 34.0 
  2000–2060  33.3 168.2    218.5  81.7    49.1 161.4 
                  
Capital stock per worker  2000–2030  6.2  144.8    -49.2  119.7    -0.5  65.4 
  2030–2060  -1.6 97.4    44.6 67.8    9.2 82.2 
  2000–2060  4.5 383.3    -26.6 268.8    8.6 201.3 
                  
Human capital per   2000–2030  -2.7  18.6    -2.4  5.2    0.4  7.3 
worker  2030–2060 -25.8 7.7    -7.5  -2.6    -12.1 2.3 
 2000–2060  -27.8  27.7    -9.7  2.5    -11.8  9.8 
                  
Income per worker  2000–2030  0.2  50.6   -21.3  34.1    0.1  23.7 
  2030–2060  -18.5 31.5    7.2 16.6    -5.6 23.8 
  2000–2060  -18.4 98.1    -15.7 56.4    -5.5 53.1 
                  
Income tax rate  2000–2030  -6.2  1.5    20.6  -15.3    0.8  -3.4 
 2030–2060  -40.8  -9.2    -22.2  -19.8    -21.6  -14.7 
 2000–2060  -44.4  -7.8    -6.2  -32.1    -21.0  -17.5 
                  
Education spending   2000–2030  -6.1  53.3    -5.4  13.9    0.8  19.8 
per worker  2030–2060  -51.8  19.3    -16.7  -6.5    -26.1  5.8 
  2000–2060  -54.7 82.8    -21.2  6.6    -25.5 26.7 
Source: Computed by author. 
1/ All numbers refer to percentage changes between the years indicated in the time period. 
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Table 3. Model Comparisons 1/ 
(aggregate values) 
 
    
 
Closed Economy 
Model 
(No Labor Mobility) 
  
Perfect Labor Mobility 
Model 
with Migrants Voting 
Only in Host Country 
  
Labor Mobility Model 
with Migrants Voting in 
Both Countries and 
Income Tax on Brain 
Drain 
  
 
Time 
Periods 
 
European 
Countries 
(1) 
 
 
SMCs 
(2) 
  
European 
Countries 
(3) 
 
 
SMCs 
(4) 
  
European 
Countries 
(5) 
 
 
SMCs 
(6) 
               
Number of workers  2000–2030  22.2  97.2    150.2  46.8    27.7  95.0 
  2030–2060  9.1 36.0    27.3 23.8   16.7 34.0 
  2000–2060  33.3 168.2    218.5  81.7    49.1 161.4 
                  
Total capital stock   2000–2030  29.8 382.8    27.0 222.5    27.0 222.5 
  2030–2060  7.3 168.5    84.0 107.7    27.5 144.2 
 2000–2060  39.2  1196.4    133.7  570.0    61.9  687.7 
                  
Total human capital   2000–2030  18.9  134.0   144.3  54.4    28.2  109.3 
  2030–2060  -19.0 46.5    17.7 20.6    2.6 37.1 
  2000–2060  -3.7 242.6    187.6  86.2    31.5 186.9 
                  
Total income   2000–2030  22.4  197.1   96.9  96.9    27.8  141.4 
  2030–2060  -11.1 78.9    36.4 44.3   10.2 65.9 
  2000–2060  8.7 431.5    168.6 184.0    40.8 300.3 
                  
Income tax rate  2000–2030  -6.2  1.5    20.6  -15.3    0.8  -3.4 
 2030–2060  -40.8  -9.2    -22.2  -19.8    -21.6  -14.7 
 2000–2060  -44.4  -7.8    -6.2  -32.1    -21.0  -17.5 
                  
Total education   2000–2030  14.7  202.3   136.8  67.2    28.8  133.6 
spending 2030–2060  -47.4  62.2    6.0 15.8    -13.7 41.8 
  2000–2060  -39.7 390.3    151.0  93.6    11.1 231.3 
Source: Computed by author. 
1/ All numbers refer to percentage changes between the years indicated in the time period. 
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Figure 1. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in Europe 
(Perfect Labor Mobility) 
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Figure 2. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in SMCs 
(Perfect Labor Mobility) 
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Figure 3. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in Europe 
(Labor Mobility w/Brain Drain Tax) 
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Figure 4. Composition of the Change in Number of Workers in SMCs 
(Labor Mobility w/Brain Drain Tax) 
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APPENDIX: THE EFFECT OF INCREASING DEPENDENCY RATIO ON THE ABILITY LEVEL OF 
THE MEDIAN VOTER 
 
  Recall that median voter is defined by  ()
1
1
0 2
m a
t
tt
NN
NN f a d a
−
−
+
+= ∫
t .  Rewriting 
this:  () ( )
1
1 0
2
t
tt m t
NN
NN F aN F
−
−
t +
+− =, which can be rearranged as: 
() ( )
1 0
2
tt
m
t
NN
Fa F
N
− −
−= .  Differentiating both sides we get,  () ()
1 ˆˆ
21
tt
mm
NN
Fa d a
−
∗
− ′ =
+η
, 
where  ˆ t
t
t
dN
N
N
= , 
1
1
1
ˆ t
t
t
dN
N
N
−
−
−
= , and 
1
1
t
t
N
N
∗
−
+η =  evaluated at the initial steady state.  
Finally this can be rearranged as 
() ( )
1
()
ˆˆ
21
tt
m
m
NN
da
Fa
−
+
−
=
′ +η
 which is negative 
when .  1 ˆ ˆ
− < t t N N
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